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nates. For one thing, member states themselves have 
displayed a breathtaking willingness to undermine the 
provisions of the treaty they themselves signed.5  Lis-
bon notwithstanding, Carl Bildt chaired the first meet-
ing of the new Foreign Affairs Council – a job which 
should have fallen to Baroness Ashton. The Spanish 
Government has done nothing to dispel rumours that 
it will act in the same way.  Meanwhile. The French 
Government has called an ad hoc meeting of cer-
tain select Foreign Ministers from the Union for the 
Mediterranean – from France, Spain and Egypt – in 
an attempt to set up a Secretariat General for the in-
stitution, thereby preempting any action by the new, 
post-Lisbon EU Foreign Policy authorities.6 
 Perhaps most worryingly, there is little sign 
that national capitals will focus on effectiveness when 
implementing the treaty. Early debates over the new 
External Action Service reveal the way in which con-
siderations of narrow national self interest will triumph 
over notions such as merit or efficiency. The larger 
member states have begun to argue forcibly that their 
officials should occupy key posts and make up the 
bulk of the new service; simultaneously, their smaller 
partners have expressed their disgruntlement at what 
they already perceive to be their marginalization in the 
foreign policy field. Estonian President Toomas Ilves 
pointed to the massive under-representation of new 
member states in the EU’s existing diplomatic service 
(only one of the one hundred and fifty eight EU Em-
bassies is headed by a diplomat from new member 
state).7  A heated fracas over who gets what is sure 
to mark the birth of this potentially crucial new institu-
tion.
 Perhaps such tussles were to be expected. Yet 
even once they are resolved, there is little reason to 
suppose the EU, armed with its new institutions, will 
prove a more coherent and effective actor in world 
politics. Take the two new posts discussed above. The 
Permanent Chair of the European Council will have 
a role in external relations, with Van Rompuy ‘at his 
level and in that capacity’ tasked with ensuring the ex-
ternal representation of the Union on issues related to 
CFSP. Baroness Ashton is charged with implementing 
these policies. 
 Yet who seriously believes that the member 
states will tolerate being sidelined on sensitive or 
high profile foreign policy issues? Had the Russian 
invasion of Georgia taken place under the new treaty 
arrangements, would President Sarkozy (who effec-
tively ignored Javier Solana during his shuttle diplo-
macy) really have taken a back seat? In the unlikely 
event that he would, could either Van Rumpuy or Ash-
ton have done what the French President did in rid-
ing roughshod over the objections of Estonia, Latvia, 
EUSA Review Forum
LIFE AFTER LISBON
Foreign and Security Policy after the Lisbon
Anand Menon
 Much of the soul searching that accompanied 
the ratification the Lisbon treaty was based on con-
cerns regarding the possible negative consequences 
of a failure to ratify, rather than any great expecta-
tions as to what a Lisbon-equipped EU would be ca-
pable of. However the one area in which observers 
believed the new treaty could provide substantive 
improvements was foreign and security policy. From 
the Laeken declaration of December 2001 to the rati-
fication of the resultant treaty in the summer of 2009, 
member states had devoted much time and energy 
to securing the passage of a document intended to 
improve the institutional system of the Union. External 
relations were the object of particular attention: twenty 
five of the sixty two amendments the treaty makes to 
the Treaty on European Union pertain to its provisions 
on CFSP and ESDP.
 Following ratification, the treaty has continued 
to generate high expectations. Whilst Assistant Sec-
retary of State Philip Gordon declared that it ‘marks a 
milestone for Europe and for its role in the world,’1  the 
Brussels CEO of PR firm Hill and Knowlton declared it 
would make the EU ‘a real entity on the global stage.’2 
Meanwhile, Elmar Brok, prominent member of the 
European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee, 
voiced his certainty that Lisbon would allow Europe to 
‘speak with one voice’.3  
 As striking as the hyperbole surrounding the 
treaty was the profound sense of disillusionment that 
greeted the announcement that Herman Von Rumpuy 
and Catherine Ashton had been chosen as inaugu-
ral holders of the newly created posts of Chair of the 
European Council and High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy respec-
tively. Carl Bildt (himself a putative candidate for the 
latter position) spoke of  ‘a historic missed opportu-
nity;’ Giscard d’Estaing bemoaned the Union’s ‘limited 
ambition’ whilst Simon Hix complained at its apparent 
desire to become a ‘supersize Switzerland.’4  Die Welt 
even coined a new term – Selbstverzwergung – to de-
scribe the Union’s apparent lack of international ambi-
tion.
 Yet it would be wrong to assume that a fail-
ure of the Treaty to deliver what many clearly feels it 
should can be put down merely to these two unfortu-
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Lithuania and Poland - all of whom disapproved of his 
willingness to sign up to a ceasefire agreement which 
did not mention the inviolability of Georgian territorial 
integrity?
 Even if member states really were prepared to 
allow others to represent them, the question remains 
as to who they would trust to do so. The rationale 
behind the creation of the post of High Representa-
tive was that it would serve as a bridge between the 
Council and the Commission. It is difficult to see how 
one individual could be expected to do this, given the 
internecine feuding that has characterized relations 
between the two institutions on matters of foreign and 
security policy. All the more so given that she will not 
have free rein. For all that the Chair of the European 
Council is meant to perform his representative func-
tions ‘without prejudice’ to the powers of the High 
Representative, this still leaves significant scope for 
friction given the role of the latter in ‘conducting’ the 
CFSP. Early unease in national capitals about Ms Ash-
ton’s decision to maintain her office in the Berlaymont 
illustrate all too clearly the danger that member states 
might not fully trust a Commissioner to represent them 
on matters of Foreign and Security policy.8  
 And should they come to do so, this will have 
implications for the Commission itself. For one thing, 
any individual too closely associated with the mem-
ber states might struggle to exert authority within that 
institution. Ashton will need good working relations 
with her colleagues because her effectiveness will de-
pend in part on her ability to collaborate with  those 
members of the College either directly (Development 
Policy, Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy, Trade 
and Overseas Aid) or indirectly (Energy, Climate, Jus-
tice and Home Affairs), involved in shaping the Com-
mission’s policies towards the outside world.
 More broadly, member states do not seem to 
have considered the implications for the delicate bal-
ance between EU institutions of placing of a Coun-
cil representative within the College. It will be inter-
esting to see the text of the oath of office taken by 
Commissioners under the second Barroso Commis-
sion. Members of the first solemnly undertook ‘to be 
completely independent in the performance of [their] 
duties, in the general interest of the Communities; in 
the performance of these duties, neither to seek nor 
to take instructions from any government or from any 
other body.’ Could Baroness Ashton really make such 
a pronouncement without keeping her fingers firmly 
crossed? What then of the sacred principle of Com-
mission independence? 
 Apart from the organizational headaches that 
await her, there is also the question of how, practically, 
Ms Ashton will manage her various responsibilities. 
Javier Solana earned a reputation as something of a 
globetrotting firefighter, clocking up an estimated  2.6 
million air miles during his tenure. It will be interesting 
to see what gives as Ashton tries to combine this func-
tion with her various other duties such as chairing the 
Foreign Affairs Committee, attending meetings of the 
College, and chairing meetings of ministers on trade 
and development policies.
 The picture is hardly more promising when it 
comes to security and defence. In the kind of leap of 
faith common amongst EU treaty writers, ESDP will 
become the Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP) under Lisbon.  Certain elements of the treaty 
merely incorporate into law what were already estab-
lished practices. Thus, it institutionalizes the ‘imple-
mentation of a mission’ by a group of states so en-
trusted by the Council on behalf of the Union as a 
whole - a procedure that has already characterized 
several ESDP missions. Similarly, the European De-
fence Agency, created in July 2004, is now mentioned 
in the treaties for the first time.
 More substantively, the treaty removes the 
block on enhanced cooperation being used for mat-
ters with defence or military implications.9  It also 
includes a provision for ‘Permanent Structured Co-
operation’, open to all states that fulfill certain require-
ments in terms of capabilities. So far, so good. Yet, 
for all the hopes elicited by the creation of the Euro-
pean Defence Agency, it is hard to see how this institu-
tion can reasonably be expected to impose stringent 
conditions on member states wishing to participate in 
such schemes. Certainly, it is charged with contribut-
ing to the ‘regular assessment of participating Member 
States’ contributions with regard to capabilities,’ and 
particularly so with regard to entry requirements for 
Permanent Structured Cooperation. Yet even leaving 
aside chronic problems of measurement, and the lack 
of comparable data on national defence spending,10  it 
is hard to see how any EU institution, particularly one 
whose Board is comprised of national defence minis-
ters, would rule definitively against one of their num-
ber on  such a sensitive issue.
 Which brings us to the crux of the matter. For 
all the hype surrounding the Lisbon institutions, they 
alone cannot be expected to generate a qualitative 
leap in terms of the EU’s foreign policy potential. After 
all, even if the Union enjoyed sufficient military capa-
bilities, consensus between member states would be 
required before these could be deployed (Permanent 
Structured cooperation does not apply to operations). 
 And of course, the fact is such capabilities sim-
ply do not exist, as revealed all too clearly in a recent 
coruscating critique by the former Head of the EDA.11 
Creating them would require decisive – and potentially 
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expensive – action at the national level rather than 
new institutions in Brussels. Similarly, neither a Cath-
erine Ashton nor a David Miliband, a Carl Bildt, nor 
even a Peter Mandelson could simply conjure, through 
strength of will, a unified EU position on Russia, China, 
or on the need to impose sanctions on Iran.
 Member states need to work through the Eu-
ropean Union if they are to enjoy an international 
role commensurate with their combined economic 
strength. Javier Solana was right to label as a ‘fantasy’ 
the ambitions of even larger European countries to 
play a meaningful independent role in world affairs.12 
For an inordinate amount of time, the unratified Lis-
bon treaty served as a useful alibi, allowing member 
states to ignore matters of substance and talk in glow-
ing terms about the potential of a post-Lisbon Union.13 
The danger now is that Catherine Ashton will serve as 
a replacement alibi, that she will become  the scape-
goat behind which member states can hide their own 
failures to live up to their lofty ambitions. For Lisbon 
really to enhance the ability of the EU to influence 
international politics, twenty seven national capitals 
must realize their responsibility to enable it to do so.
Anand Menon, University of Birmingham, UK
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Why Lisbon Won’t Do the Trick
Tanja A. Börzel
 At last! The Lisbon Treaty entered into force 
on 1 December 2009. This ends more than a decade 
of trial-and-error attempts to make the EU fit for the 
21st century. What started as the endeavour to finish 
off with the leftovers of the Maastricht Treaty soon be-
came a necessity to prepare the EU for the big bang 
enlargement. After the hopes for institutional reform 
got dashed in Nice for the first time, the member states 
set their aspirations even higher and called a Conven-
tion on the Future of Europe that should come up with 
nothing less than a European Constitution to improve 
democracy, transparency and efficiency in the EU. The 
Constitutional Treaty came close but was rejected by 
the French and the Dutch. While not rejecting Europe 
altogether, people have become increasingly frustrat-
ed with the current form of the European project.
 Students of European integration disagreed 
whether this politicization is a good or bad thing (for 
opposing views see e.g. Moravcsik, 2006 and Folles-
dal and Hix, 2006). Politicians opted for trying to stuff 
the genie back into the bottle and resorted to the prov-
en and tested IGC method. Behind closed doors, the 
German presidency sought to make the best of the 
institutional reforms the heads of states had agreed 
to in the Constitutional Treaty. Any constitutional lan-
guage that might invoke the idea of European state-
hood was erased. Most of the core institutional re-
forms, however, could be saved: the Fundamental 
Rights Charta, the legal personality, the extension of 
qualified majority voting in the Council and the intro-
duction of the double majority principle, the extension 
of the co-decision procedure, the reduced size of the 
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European Commission, the non-rotating presidency 
of the European Council, the High Representative 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Diplomatic 
Service, to name just the important ones. All the ma-
jor institutional changes the Constitutional Treaty had 
envisioned to maintain and enhance the internal and 
external action capacity of the EU-27+ were retrieved 
into the Lisbon Treaty. Yet, the EU claimed that the ‘re-
form treaty’ whose key issues had already been ratified 
by 18 member states, contained only functional rather 
than constitutional changes. As a result, only Ireland 
did not ratify the Lisbon Treaty in an exclusively parlia-
mentary process.1  The Irish had to vote twice, before 
the institutional make-over of the EU could finally be 
completed. 
 So, all is well that ends well? There seems to 
be a general feeling of relief, particularly among EU 
policy-makers. The re-elected president of the Euro-
pean Commission, José Manuel Barroso, vowed to 
put the new institutions to work to make (even) bet-
ter policies that “meet the objectives of our peoples”.2 
Yet, the Lisbon Treaty is unlikely to solve the legitimacy 
deficit that has haunted the EU ever since the Maas-
tricht Treaty. Its reforms are not sufficient to remedy 
the declining problem-solving capacity of the EU nor 
do they provide an adequate response to the increas-
ing politicization.
A Europe of Substance?
 Barroso’s pledge for a Europe of substance 
that delivers the policies that EU citizens need reflects 
the traditional ‘Monnet method’ of producing efficient 
policy achievements at the EU level that will win public 
support in the member states. The problem of this fo-
cus on output legitimacy is that the effectiveness of the 
EU system of multi-level governance is increasingly 
at stake since it does not have the power to perform 
important governance functions such as macroeco-
nomic stabilization and redistribution (on the following 
see Börzel, 2010). The EU governs the largest mar-
ket in the world. It has a comprehensive regulatory 
framework that has successfully prevented and cor-
rected market failures. In (re-)distributive policy areas, 
however, the member states have not been willing to 
resort to supranational institutions in order to counter-
act politically undesired outcomes of the Single Mar-
ket. At the same time, EU market integration impedes 
the member states in maintaining such functions. The 
Single Currency largely deprives the member states 
of their major instruments for national macroeconomic 
stabilization, while the Maastricht convergence criteria 
put serious constraints on state expenditures. Softer 
modes of governance are unlikely to respond to this 
“European problem-solving gap” (Scharpf, 2006: 855). 
Attempts to use the Open Method of Coordination 
(OMC) for institutionalizing member state coordination 
in areas such as taxation of mobile capital, employ-
ment, or social policy, where the heterogeneity and 
political salience of member state preferences prohibit 
supranational forms of governance, are no remedy. 
They pale in light of the redistributive effects of supra-
national centralization in monetary policy, on the one 
hand, and political competition with regard to taxes 
and labour costs, on the other. The principle of mutual 
recognition only contains the progressive dismantling 
of national standards if it operates under the shadow 
of supranational hierarchy. This is particularly the case 
for highly politicized issues. Redistributive or norma-
tive conflicts are hard to solve without the possibility of 
resorting to authoritative decision-making. 
 The Lisbon Treaty does little to address the 
dilemma of European governance where ‘soft’ forms 
appear to require a shadow of supranational hierarchy 
to address policy problems, which the member states 
refuse to make subject to ‘hard’ supranational forms of 
governance in the first place. The institutional reforms 
may help to increase the effectiveness of EU policy-
making in areas of what used to be the First Pillar. 
While the Lisbon Treaty formalizes the coordination 
of economic and employment policies of the member 
states, macroeconomic stabilization firmly remains in 
the realm of voluntary intergovernmental cooperation. 
What is even more important, the Lisbon Treaty does 
nothing to strengthen the tax and spending power of 
the EU. Its redistributive capacity is currently limited to 
less than two percent of the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) generated by all member states. With upcom-
ing enlargements (Western Balkans), the redistribu-
tive capacity of the EU is likely to decrease rather than 
increase. The EU remains a “regulatory state” (Ma-
jone, 1994), which lacks the formal competence and 
the political capacity to generate growth, employment 
and solidarity. But this is what the peoples of Europe 
may expect, particularly since the economic crisis hit. 
The ‘capacity-expectation gap’ (Hill, 1993) the EU is 
facing in governing the Single Market renders it next 
to impossible for the EU to win back the permissive 
consensus of its citizens. On the contrary, it fuels the 
increasing politicization that undermines the EU’s in-
put legitimacy.
Contested Europe?
 The ‘reform circus’ has effectively ended the 
“permissive consensus”, which sustained European 
integration for the first four decades, turning it into 
what Gary Marks and Liesbet Hooghe have called 
a “constraining dissent” (Hooghe and Marks, 2008). 
While not rejecting Europe altogether, people have 
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become increasingly frustrated with the current form 
of the European project. The finalité politique of Eu-
ropean integration has always been contested. But 
the French and the Dutch referenda shifted political 
contestation from elite dominated institutions of repre-
sentative democracy (parties, interest groups) into the 
public sphere. This is not the place to discuss the driv-
ers of this politicization (see Hooghe and Marks, 2008; 
Risse, 2010). If Hooghe and Marks are correct that 
attitudes towards European integration are shaped 
by identity issues rather than the left-right cleavage 
which largely structures the party systems in most EU 
member states, this has important implications for the 
democratic legitimacy of the EU. The conflict in pub-
lic opinion between exclusive nationalism, on the one 
hand, and national identities that includes allegiance 
to Europe, on the other hand, has been used primar-
ily by Euroskeptical parties. The result is politicization, 
which entails a shift from elite-driven interest group 
politics to mass politics. Mobilizing citizens certainly 
is an important step towards more democracy in the 
EU. However, their interests need to be aggregated 
and represented in the EU policy process. The tradi-
tional mass integration parties of the center-left and 
the center-right cannot politicize the identity-related 
cleavages for electoral purposes without antagonizing 
parts of their own core constituencies. As a result, they 
will shy away from politicizing European integration 
leaving this issue to the Euroskeptical populists. Thus, 
the more the finalité politique of European integration 
becomes politicized in domestic arenas, the more we 
expect populist parties on the fringes of either the left 
or the right to pick up the anti-European vote. 
 However, the current efforts by European elites 
to put the genie back into the bottle will inevitably fail 
(see Risse, 2010). In all likelihood, these efforts will 
result in even more “sleeping giants” (Franklin and 
Van der Eijk, 2006) waking up in the various mem-
ber states. If the EU is not capable of addressing its 
peoples’ most pressing problems, populist parties (on 
either the right or the left fringes of the political spec-
trum) will exploit these failures for political purposes. 
If the mass integration parties in Europe want to re-
gain lost ground in the battle over European integra-
tion, they have to live up to politicization. The way to 
do this and to gain ground in electoral battles would 
be to politicize Europe along the left/right cleavage: 
why should we not have public debates on the fu-
ture of nuclear energy, more or less migration, or the 
liberalization of public services? The European Par-
liament does not reach far enough into the national 
public spheres to launch such debates in the member 
states. But national parliaments do. Most of them pos-
sess comprehensive participatory rights in EU affairs 
(Raunio and O’Brennan, 2007). And the Lisbon Treaty 
expands the role of Member States' parliaments in EU 
policy-making. Yet, national parliaments have made 
only timid use of their EU-related powers both at the 
domestic and the EU level. Not only do national parlia-
mentarians often lack the capacity to keep track of the 
EU legislative process. They have little incentives to 
engage in EU politics as long as their re-election does 
not depend on how they position themselves towards 
key EU policies. But policy-makers could foster the 
salience of EU policies by informing citizens and by 
debating what is at stake before Brussels decides. If 
they continue on the de-politicization track, Euroskep-
tics will take care of European politics on the domestic 
levels. This will result in more difficult EU decision-
making – and further erosion of EU legitimacy. In other 
words, a vicious cycle is likely, and the Lisbon Treaty 
can do nothing to prevent it.
 To conclude, the Lisbon Treaty has not much 
to offer to address the legitimacy deficit the EU faces. 
The bad news is that this will probably have been the 
last major reform in years to come. It is hard to see 
how 27 member states and more will be able to agree 
on any deepening of European integration in the near 
future. The good news is that the legitimacy problems 
of the EU mostly reside at the national rather than the 
EU-level (see Schmidt, 2006). It is the national politi-
cians that have to link EU policies with domestic poli-
tics. This does not require any institutional reforms. 
What is needed is a political culture that does not 
silence public debates on Europe but focuses them 
on policy-related questions of what kind of Europe we 
want.
Tanja A. Börzel, Freie Universität Berlin, Germany
Notes
 1Eight member states held (Spain, Luxembourg) or 
intended to hold (UK, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Ireland, Poland, Portugal) referenda on the Constitu-
tional Treaty.
210 October 2009, Warsaw - Speech by José Manuel 
Durão Barroso, President of the European Commis-
sion, at the Signature Ceremony for the Lisbon Treaty 
in Poland, http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/es/
article_9081_es.htm, last access 30 December 2009.
References
Börzel, T. A. (2010) 'European Governance - Nego-
tiation and Competition in the Shadow of Hierarchy', 
Journal of Common Market Studies, 48, 2, 191-219.
EUSA Review    Winter 2010  7 
Follesdal, A. and Hix, S. (2006) 'Why There Is a 'Dem-
ocratic Deficit' in the EU: A Response to Majone and 
Moravcsik', Journal of Common Market Studies, 44, 3, 
533-562.
Franklin, M. and Van der Eijk, C. (2006) 'The Sleep-
ing Giant: Potential for Political Mobilization of Disaf-
fection in Europe' in W. Van der Brug and C. Van der 
Eijk (eds.) European Elections and Domestic Politics: 
Lessons from the Past and Scenarios for the Future 
(Notre Dame IN: University of Notre Dame Press).
Hill, C. (1993) 'The Capability-Expectations Gap or 
Conceptualising Europe's Interantional Role', Journal 
of Common Market Studies, 31, 3, 305-328.
Hooghe, L. and Marks, G. (2008) 'A Postfunctional-
ist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive 
Consensus to Constraining Dissensus', British Journal 
of Political Science.
Majone, G. (1994) 'The Rise of the Regulatory State in 
Europe', West European Politics, 17, 3, 77-101.
Moravcsik, A. (2006) 'What Can We Learn from the 
European Constitutional Project?', Politische Viertel-
jahresschrift, 47, 2, 219-241.
Raunio, T. and O’Brennan, J. (2007) National Par-
liaments within the Enlarged European Union: From 
-Victims- of Integration to Competitive Actors? (Lon-
don: Routledge).
Risse, T. (2010) A Community of Europeans? Trans-
national Identities and Public Spheres (Itahaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press).
Scharpf, F. W. (2006) 'The Joint-Decision Trap Revis-
ited', Journal of Common Market Studies, 44, 4, 845-
864.
Schmidt, V. A. (2006) Democracy in Europe. The 
EU and National Polities (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press).
 
The Lisbon Treaty and Economic Policy
Michele Chang
 When the financial crisis spread to Europe in 
the fall of 2008, the EU was not in a strong position 
institutionally to deal with a crisis of any kind. Almost a 
decade of negotiations and referenda yielded a treaty 
that did not pass muster with the Irish electorate in 
June 2008 and left the institutional future of the EU 
uncertain. Nevertheless, under the leadership of the 
French presidency, the EU was able to (eventually) 
present a (relatively) united front and effectively deal 
with the crisis in the short-term. Now that the Lisbon 
Treaty is in force, what difference will it make to eco-
nomic policy? Is the EU now better equipped to handle 
future crises or prevent them? 
 Most agree that having the Lisbon Treaty in 
place would not have made much of a difference in 
terms of the handling of the crisis, as it made relatively 
few changes in the realm of economic policy. Indeed, 
the purpose of the Lisbon Treaty was broader institu-
tional reform rather than making sweeping changes in 
economic policy. The Lisbon Treaty instead aimed at 
revising the functioning of the EU in a way that could 
better accommodate its expanded membership, striv-
ing to give it more coherence internationally and inter-
nally. The Lisbon Treaty’s reforms relating to econom-
ic policy are more organizational and symbolic rather 
than substantive. Nevertheless they can still have 
an important impact on the functioning of economic 
cooperation, depending on how the Member States 
choose to interpret and implement measures (for a 
more detailed account of the Lisbon Treaty’s changes 
and implications for economic policy, see Frankal et al, 
2007-8). 
 The European Central Bank was deliberately 
created as one of the most independent central banks 
in the world. The Lisbon Treaty lists the ECB among 
the Community’s institutions, a change from the previ-
ous situation. There had been concern in some circles 
that this could somehow impinge on the bank’s inde-
pendence. However over the last decade the ECB has 
earned its reputation for independence and there are 
no new provisions in the treaty that weaken its power 
in this regard.
 The Euro Group emerged as a compromise be-
tween France and Germany: the former desired a po-
litical counterweight to the independent ECB while the 
latter sought to protect the bank’s independence and 
keep any such group politically weak. The result was 
this informal institution comprised of the economic and 
finance ministers of the countries participating in the 
euro area, a mini-Ecofin with no mandate and no for-
mal powers. Prior to Ecofin meetings the Euro Group 
discusses issues of common concern and serves as 
an important forum for exchanging ideas and forging a 
consensus among members. The Eurogroup receives 
its first formal mention in the Lisbon Treaty, though de-
cision-making power still rests with Ecofin. In effect, the 
informality of the group was formalized, and its “meet-
ings shall take place..to discuss questions related to 
the specific responsibilities they share with regard 
to the single currency.” Moreover the Lisbon Treaty 
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states that the group’s goal is “to promote conditions 
for stronger economic growth in the European Union 
and, to that end, to develop ever-closer coordination 
of economic policies within the euro area” (Protocol on 
the Euro Group, Treaty of Lisbon). However the Euro 
Group does not receive any additional policy instru-
ments or resources to help achieve that objective, so 
it remains up the Member States to coordinate (or not) 
their economic policies. The lack of sufficient coordi-
nation had already been identified as preventing the 
euro area from achieving its full potential, something 
that became painfully obvious in the early stages of 
the financial crisis in 2008 when governments initially 
responded with national measures without consulting 
(or presumably even considering) the impact on other 
euro area countries. 
 The Lisbon Treaty contains nothing that would 
have changed this situation, had it been in force at the 
time. Economic policy coordination remains a shared 
competence: for example, the EU sets guidelines for 
employment policy, and the Council can then coor-
dinate national economic and employment policies. 
The Lisbon Treaty does allow a vanguard of Member 
States to move forward on cooperation, broadening the 
possible extent of enhanced cooperation. A minimum 
of 9 Member States can cooperate more intensively, 
permitting the possibility of closer links in economic 
policy cooperation (including fiscal policy). While it al-
lows for forward momentum, it also raises the possibil-
ity of a Europe à la carte that could change the nature 
of European integration by having countries pick and 
choose what they want to take part in and undermin-
ing solidarity.
 Institutionally the treaty recognizes the elec-
tion of a Euro Group permanent president (with a 2.5 
year renewable term, the position holding a two-year 
term prior to the Lisbon Treaty). Jean-Claude Juncker 
(Prime Minister and Finance Minister of Luxembourg) 
has held this position since 2005. The Lisbon Treaty 
also notes the participation of the Commission and 
invitation of the ECB to its meetings (which had al-
ready been the case). Though it does not have formal 
decision-making powers, as the euro area expands 
it could easily become the de facto decision-making 
body if they were able to come to a common agree-
ment in advance of the Ecofin meetings.
 In terms of specific policy measures, the Lis-
bon Treaty offers fine-tuning rather than major chang-
es. The run up to the 2005 reform of the Stability and 
Growth Pact led many to criticize the voting rules that 
allowed the Member State that was under consid-
eration for breaking the rules to be able to vote for 
whether or not they should be subject to a reprimand 
and eventually a fine. The Lisbon Treaty rectifies this 
situation by no longer allowing the Member State to 
have voting rights in such situations; they are only 
able to participate in the relevant discussions (Article 
126.13)
 The Commission acquires a larger role in 
the coordination of economic policy. Article 99 of the 
TEC allows the Council, on the basis of a Commis-
sion recommendation, to make recommendations to a 
Member State that is pursuing economic policies that 
conflict with the broad guidelines of economic policies 
established by the Council. The updated treaty also al-
lows the Commission to directly address the Member 
State and issue a warning (Article 121.4).
 In addition to these measures that are spe-
cifically directed towards economic policy, the Lisbon 
Treaty’s other innovations also have implications. The 
changes that have received the most attention are the 
creation of a permanent president of the EU Council 
and a High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Se-
curity Policy. The latter in particular has repercussions 
for the external representation of the euro, in that an-
other actor now has a claim to the title of “Mr/Ms Euro” 
in international fora, thus adding to the already im-
pressive array of potential euro area representatives 
that include the Commissioner for Economic Affairs, 
the President of the European Central Bank, and the 
President of the Euro Group.
 The move to co-decision as the normal legisla-
tive procedure gives the European Parliament more 
influence in areas critical to economic cooperation, in-
cluding services, capital mobility, and intellectual prop-
erty rights. Moreover several measures related to the 
SGP and the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines grant 
the EP more decision-making power (such as Article 
121.6, which allows for the establishment of “detailed 
rules” via the ordinary legislative procedure for the 
multilateral surveillance procedure). This is in keeping 
with the interest in granting the EP more responsibil-
ity and more prestige, thus improving the democratic 
credentials of the EU more generally.
 In summary the Lisbon Treaty offers the EU 
some fine-tuning when it comes to economic policy. It 
codifies some things that were already done in practice 
(such as the Euro Group meetings) and alters some 
decision-making procedures in ways that make them 
either more rational (like voting rules in determining 
excessive deficits) or democratic (the switch to ordi-
nary legislative procedure). More than anything, how-
ever, the Lisbon Treaty reveals the reluctance of Mem-
ber States to further sacrifice their sovereignty when 
it comes to economic policy-making. While monetary 
union has been regarded as successful, it falls short 
of the more optimistic expectations that it would vastly 
improve economic growth and convergence between 
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Member States. A decade after the introduction of the 
euro, Euro Group members already exhibited a striking 
degree of divergence and unwillingness to coordinate 
economic policy. The political capital to substantially 
expand EU powers into areas like economic and fis-
cal policy did not exist. Even after the financial crisis, 
the results of attempts at the coordination of financial 
regulation and supervision have yielded modest re-
sults. Despite the catalyst caused by the financial cri-
sis (which did have other effects regarding economic 
and monetary policy coordination, in particular spur-
ring greater interest in joining the euro area), Mem-
ber States have not settled on a model that would be 
viewed as politically suitable for all. The Lisbon Treaty 
thus contains incremental changes that could allow for 
greater cooperation in the future, but no major shifts in 
the short- to medium-term.
Michele Chang, College of Europe, Bruge Belgium
Reference
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Between Wishful Thinking and Late Realism
Andrés Malamud
 “Who do I call if I want to call Latin America?” If 
Henry Kissinger had a point when he allegedly asked 
for the phone number of Europe, anyone who asked 
today the same question about Latin America would 
be twice as perceptive. Moreover, while the European 
Union has recently increased its participation in the 
phone book by adding two further numbers, Latin 
America is still hoping to inaugurate its first one. Indeed, 
there is no regional organization that brings together 
all the Latin American countries in exclusivity: the Or-
ganization of American States (OAS) includes Canada 
and the United States, the Ibero-American Community 
includes Andorra, Portugal and Spain, the Latin Amer-
ican Integration Association (ALADI) includes only 
twelve of the twenty Latin American States, the Union 
of South American Nations (UNASUR) reunites ten 
of them together with Guyana and Surinam, and the 
processes of sub-regional integration (MERCOSUR, 
the Andean Community, the Central American Integra-
tion System) are even less encompassing as regards 
membership. One potential exception stands out: the 
Rio Group, which numbers twenty-three members in-
cluding all of Latin America and a few countries from 
the Caribbean. Yet, there is a caveat: this organization 
does not have a secretariat or permanent body, so if it 
had a number it could only be a cell phone. So much 
for Latin America as a regional organization. But so, 
how could Latin America be an international actor?
 Metternich once famously defined Italy as 
a geographic expression. By that he meant that the 
putative country lacked unity other than spatial conti-
guity. In contrast, Latin America is allegedly united by 
language, history and culture in addition to geography, 
so it would make sense to expect from it some kind 
of coherent international action. This is what the Eu-
ropean Union may have anticipated when it called for 
the first EU-LAC summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1999, af-
ter which four others followed. However, Latin America 
is no closer to acquire a phone number today than it 
was ten years ago – and even less so if the Carib-
bean is counted into the region. This was clear from 
the beginning for some observers, but only recently 
has come home to the EU authorities. Hence, the EU 
has apparently decided to keep the routine of biannual 
bi-regional summits, but at the same time it has sped 
up several processes of negotiation of bilateral part-
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South America and a key player in Latin America. 
Brazil is now actively pursuing this role in the Mer-
cosur framework and is at the forefront of the drive 
to promote the Union of South American Nations 
(UNASUR)... Positive leadership of Brazil could 
move forward Mercosur negotiations.1
 
 Although the EU did certainly not intend to 
harm its relations with Mercosur, its pompous rhetoric 
had negative repercussions in the region. By calling 
Brazil a “regional leader”, “global leader”, “champion 
of the developing world”, “a quasi-continent in its own 
right”, and “a natural leader in South America”, it im-
paired both its own position and the Brazilian stand 
vis-à-vis other South American countries.
 Brazil is definitely a world giant. The fifth 
country by area and population and the eighth by the 
economy, it is however the only one of its class. Un-
like the other BRICs (Russia, India and China), it does 
not have – nor aspires to have – nuclear weapons. It 
enjoys internationally agreed borders and a relatively 
peaceful historical record since the end of the XIX cen-
tury. And unlike the Hispanic American countries, it has 
never split up, its political transitions have been mostly 
mild – from empire to republic and from dictatorship 
to democracy alike – and its domestic affairs are pro-
cessed through negotiation rather than confrontation. 
The European Union fits twice into its territory and its 
200 million people make of it a “monster country”, in 
George Kennan’s apt phrase. However in spite of its 
regional preeminence, Brazil has been so far unable 
to translate its structural an instrumental resources 
into effective leadership. Its potential followers have 
not aligned with its main foreign policy goals, such as 
a permanent seat in the Security Council, the quest for 
the WTO Director-General chair and its bid for presid-
ing over the Inter-American Development Bank, and 
some have even challenged its regional influence. 
By playing the regional card to achieve global ends, 
Brazil ended up in an unexpected situation: while its 
regional leadership has grown in paper, it has been 
weakened in practice. Yet, its global recognition has 
widened. Today, Brazil is acknowledged as an emer-
gent global actor by the world established powers, as 
the EU itself has shown. This means that now there is 
a phone number in Latin America – but it is not Latin 
America’s. The voice at the end of the line answers 
in Portuguese, a language foreign to nineteen of the 
twenty Latin American countries – and even more for-
eign if the thirteen Caribbean countries are considered. 
Not that culture or language is a hindrance to regional 
integration: it has not been so in Europe. By the same 
token, if it were as decisive an asset, the Arab world 
would be united today instead of ridden with conflict. 
nerships with individual Latin American countries. The 
most “strategic” of these agreements has been signed 
with the largest state in the region.
 In May 2007 the EU recommended to launch 
a strategic partnership to further deepen its ties with 
Brazil. The first ever EU-Brazil Summit was held in Lis-
bon in July 2007, after the strong impulse of the Portu-
guese presidency of the European Council. This event 
had two consequences: on the one hand, it conferred 
Brazil the same status as other emerging world pow-
ers the EU had already signed strategic partnership 
agreements with, i.e. China, India, Russia and South 
Africa. On the other, it differentiated Brazil from the 
other Latin American countries and went against the 
proclaimed EU goals of bloc-to-bloc negotiations. Al-
though the substance of the agreements left outside 
trade issues, which were to be dealt with directly with 
Mercosur, “central topics of the new partnership includ-
ed effective multilateralism, climate change, sustain-
able energy, the fight against poverty, the Mercosur’s 
integration process and Latin America’s stability and 
prosperity.” According to the EU website, “[t]his new 
relationship places Brazil, the Mercosur region and 
South America high on the EU’s political map” (http://
ec.europa.eu/external_relations/brazil/index_en.htm, 
retrieved 15/12/2009). However, most of Brazilian 
neighbors felt that they were left out of the map and 
that this move will damage regional integration further. 
The formal document issued by the Commission helps 
to understand this reaction:
 Over the last years, Brazil has become an in-
creasingly significant global player and emerged 
as a key interlocutor for the EU. However, until re-
cently EU-Brazil dialogue has not been sufficiently 
exploited and carried out mainly through EU-Mer-
cosur dialogue. Brazil will be the last “BRICS” to 
meet the EU in a Summit. The time has come to 
look at Brazil as a strategic partner as well as a 
major Latin American economic actor and regional 
leader. The first EU-Brazil Summit, will take place 
in Lisbon in July 2007, and will mark a turning point 
in EU-Brazil relations… Its emerging economic and 
political role brings new responsibilities for Brazil as 
a global leader. The proposed strategic partnership 
between Brazil and EU should help Brazil in exer-
cising positive leadership globally and regionally 
and to engage with the EU in a global, strategic, 
substantial and open dialogue both bilaterally and 
in multilateral and regional fora... Over the last few 
years Brazil has emerged as a champion of the de-
veloping world in the UN and at the WTO... Brazil is 
a vital ally for the EU in addressing these and other 
challenges in international fora. A quasi-continent 
in its own right, Brazil’s demographic weight and 
economic development make it a natural leader in 
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The key issue is that the person answering phone calls 
from abroad does so in Portuguese not just because 
she is Brazilian, but because she is a Brazilian official. 
Latin America does not only lack a phone number: it 
also misses a regional bureaucracy and a budget, not 
to speak of such intangible elements as a flag, an an-
them or a people.
 The EU-LAC summits are not a bad idea: these 
kind of fora function as a meeting point for political 
learning, best practices diffusion, confidence building 
and public communication. Still, it should be kept in 
mind that this is a “one vis-à-vis none” (or, at best, 
many) relation and not a bi-regional arena. If the EU 
ever thought of performing the role of an external fed-
erator in Latin America, it had better think it over again. 
By picking some countries as strategic partners, it 
showed realism but spoiled its dream of cloning itself 
across the Atlantic.
Andrés Malamud, Institute of Social Sciences, 
University of Lisbon, Portugal
Notes
1(Communication from the Commission to the Council 
and the European Parliament. Towards an EU-Brazil 
Strategic Partnership (COM(2007) 281), Brussels, 30 
May 2007: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/bra-
zil/docs/com07_281_en.pdf, retrieved 15/12/2009).
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Development Policy, the Treaty of Lisbon and the 
EU’s role in the International Arena 
Maurizio Carbone
Introduction
 Development policy in the European Union 
(EU) has gone under a number of substantial transfor-
mations since the early 2000s. This new era involves 
both the European Community (EC) programme – 
which has become more efficient and poverty-oriented 
at the cost of reduced partnership and ownership – 
and the attempt to ‘federalise’ the policies of the Mem-
ber States – hence the adoption of the European Con-
sensus on Development and the ambitious agenda 
on aid effectiveness.1  In this paper, I argue that with 
the beginning of the new century, the EU has used 
development policy as part of its wider external rela-
tions agenda, in the attempt to find a role in the inter-
national arena and establish itself as a global power. 
By contrast, between the 1950s and the 1990s, EU 
development policy was conceived (and also studied) 
as an interaction between a donor and a recipient (or 
a group of recipients). This old approach, exemplified 
by the progressive Lomé Convention, gave the EU a 
distinctive place, but in the international development 
discourse. Its most celebrated features, though this 
applies only to EC development policy, were: a genu-
ine partnership, a ‘contractual approach’ to structural 
adjustments, the insertion of a human rights clause 
in all development programmes. The Treaty of Lisbon 
broadly confirms the recent trends, with a more co-
herent yet more ‘politically’ driven EU external action. 
Development policy has in theory been strengthened, 
but the interpretation and implementation of the new 
provisions – particularly the potential subordination of 
development to foreign policy objectives – has raised 
concerns among practitioners.
EC development policy: more Europe, less 
partnership?
 Traditionally, analysts of EU development 
policy provide assessments of the relations between 
the EC and different development regions. Of course, 
the relations with the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
(ACP) group have found a privileged space in schol-
arly analyses, while other developing areas have gen-
erally been less studied. The attempt I have made in 
my work is to take a longitudinal approach, identifying 
some distinct phases in the evolution of development 
policy since the Treaty of Rome (see Carbone, 2007). 
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In a first phase (from the late 1950s to the mid-1980s), 
EC development policy was limited in both geographi-
cal and policy scopes, but was very progressive. The 
Lomé Convention, at least in its first decade, was con-
sidered a ‘high water mark’ for developing countries, 
not only for the generous aid and trade packages, but 
also because decisions were taken together by the EU 
and the ACP group, with the support of joint institu-
tions. Relations with other developing regions during 
this period were minimal, though in the early 1970s 
the EU launched a Generalised System of Preferenc-
es (GSP) to give trade preferences to non-ACP de-
veloping countries. Between the late 1980s and the 
late 1990s, EC development policy broadened both 
in terms of geographical and policy scopes. Following 
the Treaty of Maastricht and the first steps towards a 
common foreign and security policy (CFSP), the EU 
sought to become an influential global actor. Its in-
creased involvement in all regions of the developing 
world, however, meant that ACP countries (especially 
those in Africa) became relatively less important. At the 
same time, the EU complied with the existing interna-
tional consensus, mainly following trends established 
by the Bretton Woods Institutions and the WTO. In line 
with the dominant Washington consensus, economic 
(first) and political (later) conditions were attached to 
the disbursement of aid. Moreover, the non-reciprocal 
trade regime with the ACP came under pressure be-
cause it was considered incompatible with WTO rules. 
In this decade, in sum, development policy started to 
be seen within the overall EU external agenda, though 
a well defined vision (not to mention identity) had yet 
not developed (Arts and Dickson, 2004;  Söderbaum 
and Stålgren). 
 Since the early 2000s the EU has entered a 
completely new stage. Its programme has become 
more poverty-oriented and more efficient, but at the 
same time it has incorporated new concerns reflect-
ing its own interests, most notably in the areas of 
trade, security and migration. The Cotonou Agree-
ment, signed in June 200, introduced a number of fun-
damental changes to the Lomé acquis. On the one 
hand, it changed the aid and trade regimes. Aid al-
location was made conditional not only on needs but 
also on performance through a system of rolling pro-
gramming on the basis of jointly agreed country strat-
egy papers (CSPs). New free trade agreements, the 
so-called economic partnership agreements (EPAs), 
were meant to replace the previous preferential trade 
regime by January 2008 – though by the agreed dead-
line only the Caribbean and Pacific region managed 
to sign interim agreements. On the other hand, the 
political dimension of the EU-ACP relations was sig-
nificantly strengthened: new issues such as security, 
arms trade, migration and, following the first revision 
in 2005, the fight against terrorism and the prolifera-
tion of weapons of mass destruction entered the EU 
development discourse. Similar trends towards a se-
curitisation of development – of course the 9/11 events 
did play a role – have been experienced in the Medi-
terranean as well as in Central and South-East Asia. 
More significantly, empirical evidence coming from the 
negotiations of the 2002-2007 and 2008-2013 CSPs 
and of the EPAs show that the EU is very preoccupied 
with improving its development image and pursuing 
a coherent external policy, rather than addressing the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and increas-
ing ownership. In the case of the CSPs, the EU has 
concentrated on delivering aid fast and on coordinat-
ing with the Member States – this is laudable, but the 
cost has been the failure to successfully engage with 
recipients and address local needs. In the case of the 
EPAs, DG Trade, which has acted as the leading actor 
in the negotiations, has emphasized trade liberalization 
to the detriment of the development aspect of trade. 
Unsurprisingly, various African leaders have publicly 
complained that their views had not been taken into 
consideration and the EU had attempted to impose its 
economic development models on what should have 
been its ‘partners’. 
Towards full aid integration?
 Development policy in the EU, though analysts 
often tend to make this mistake, does not involve only 
the programme managed at the EC level. A number 
of efforts have been made to foster coordination and 
complementarity between the policies managed by 
the European Commission and those managed by the 
Member States. These efforts started with the negotia-
tions of the Treaty of Rome, when the proposal for a 
‘common’ development policy was taken into account 
(similarly to what was decided for trade and agricul-
ture). The full communitization of aid did not happen, 
and the then six Member States simply transferred 
some money to the supranational level. Aid integration 
did not appear in the EU policy agenda in the following 
three decades, mostly due to disagreements among 
the various Member States, including resistance com-
ing from national aid bureaucracies. The Treaty of 
Maastricht (1993) was meant to represent a water-
shed in that it institutionalised the principles of com-
plementarity and coordination, as well as coherence 
(the so-called 3Cs), but the rhetoric did not match the 
reality. Limited progress, if any, was made on these 
issues up to the early 2000s, due to the territorial and 
ideological clashes within the European Commission 
and the weak constituency of development vis-à-vis 
other policies in the Member States (Holland, 2002).
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 Some unexpected changes occurred at the 
beginning of the 2000s. The joint commitment to boost 
foreign aid – made by all Member States first in March 
2002 and then in May 2005 – were complemented by 
an ambitious agenda on aid effectiveness, with the 
aim to deliver aid better and faster (Orbie, 2008).  In 
this sense, it should be pointed out how discussions 
on aid coordination in the EU context, contrary to what 
is generally believed, played an instrumental role in 
the road towards the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness. Probably the most renowned achieve-
ment of these years is the European Consensus on 
Development (2005), which for the time ever provided 
a policy platform setting out common objectives and 
principles of development cooperation for the whole 
EU. The European Consensus on Development 
stressed the EU seeks to promote a number of gen-
eral norms – those identified by Manners in his work 
on normative power Europe, including effective multi-
lateralism – as well other development related norms 
– such as participation, political dialogue, partnership 
and ownership. A last minute decision to exclude from 
the initial proposal made by the European Commis-
sion a common implementing framework – because of 
the resistance of the United Kingdom and the Nordic 
countries – reappeared two years later in the form of a 
Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of 
Labour. This called on Member States to concentrate 
their activities in a limited number of countries and to 
focus activities on no more than three sectors per de-
veloping country. All these decisions, most important-
ly, had to be agreed in dialogue with their EU peers. 
With all these initiatives, the EU acting as a single de-
velopment actor was certainly attempting to promote 
aid effectiveness – by avoiding overlapping between 
27+1 aid programmes – but at the same time was try-
ing to strengthen its profile in international politics. The 
targets, though not mentioned in official papers, were 
the US and the World Bank, whose development para-
digms were dominating in international fora.
 But development policy is not only about public 
money transferred from the North to the South. Several 
policies that have a direct impact on developing coun-
tries can be made coherent with foreign aid to promote 
the interests and needs of the developing countries. In 
light with these views, in 2005 the European Commis-
sion launched an ambitious programme on policy co-
herence for development (PCD), eventually endorsed 
by the Council. When this agenda was launched, it 
was celebrated as a major achievement for the EU, 
succeeding where other international organisations 
had failed (Carbone, 2009). However, various reports, 
including two produced by the European Commission 
itself in 2007 and 2009, have shown that despite the 
increased number of policy mechanisms difficulties 
encountered at the national level often spill over to 
the EU level and are sometimes self-reinforcing. Of 
course, making policies coherent is not an easy task 
for several reasons, the most important of which is the 
fact that the policy-making process is compartmen-
talised, involving various policy sub-systems, each 
with its own logic reflecting different interests, per-
ceptions and values – not to mention the complex EU 
institutional structure. Nevertheless, while the inten-
tions were good, the interviews I have conducted with 
policy makers in Brussels seem to suggest that the 
PCD agenda was embraced by the development com-
munity in anticipation of failures in the coordination of 
foreign aid, thus (temporarily) shifting responsibilities 
from development to other policy areas.
 All these issue lead to an interesting debate, 
that is the extent to which the EU is a leader or a fol-
lower in international development. I argue that since 
the beginning of the 2000s the European Union, par-
ticularly when it has been able to act as a single de-
velopment actor, has significantly shaped the pace 
of international development. In fact, the decisions to 
boots aid volumes, the efforts towards better aid coor-
dination, the bold commitments on policy coherence 
for development, show that the EU may have import-
ed these ideas from somewhere else, but by making 
clear choices it has considerably conditioned the be-
haviour of other international actors. The test of the 
EU’s loft ambitious – not only on PCD, but also on the 
implementation of the Code of Conduct – have so far 
produced mixed results, but the level of the changes 
introduced over the past few years has been sensa-
tional, so it may take some time to change well estab-
lished practises. 
The implications of Lisbon
 The entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 
December 2009 has brought a number of significant 
changes to the EU’s external relations, including de-
velopment policy.  At a more general level, in addition 
to the new President of the European Council, which 
will ensure continuity of policy priorities beyond presi-
dencies, the creation of the new post of High Repre-
sentative (HR) for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
(FASP) and the European External Action Service 
(EEAS) will reinforce the overall consistency of the 
EU’s action in the international arena. The double-hat 
HR – in fact Catherine Ashton chairs the new Foreign 
Affairs Council and at the same time is the Vice-Pres-
ident of the European Commission – should improve 
coherence between the intergovernmental FASP and 
the supranational external relations. In fulfilling her 
mandate, she should receive support from the EAAS, 
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made up of officials coming from the Member States, 
the Council Secretariat, and the European Commis-
sion, which will also provide staff for the EU Delega-
tions in third countries. Development policy becomes 
one of the EU’s areas of external actions and for the 
first time development and the eradication of poverty 
are mentioned among the EU’s overall objectives in its 
external action. 
 At a more specific level, the Treaty of Lisbon, 
whilst confirming most of the existing provisions in a 
separate section devoted solely to development pol-
icy, introduces some important changes. First, it sets 
out that fighting poverty is the central gaol of the EU’s 
development policy: “Union development cooperation 
policy shall have as its primary objective the reduction 
and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty”. This 
represents a significant change from the past, which 
mentioned ‘sustainable development’, ‘smooth and 
gradual integration into the world economy” and ‘the 
campaign against world poverty’ as key objectives. 
Second, the notion of policy coherence for develop-
ment remains practically unchanged: this implies that 
PCD applies to both external and internal policies. 
Third, the principles of complementarity and coordi-
nation have been strengthened. While previously EC 
development policy had to complement national de-
velopment policies, now the two aspects of EU devel-
opment policy ‘complement and reinforce each other’. 
The European Commission still remains in charge of 
promoting coordination (Koeb, 2008). 
 The new institutional framework and the vague-
ness of some provisions have generated mixed feel-
ings among practitioners. On the one hand, some have 
pointed that development cooperation has certainly 
been strengthened by the Lisbon Treaty. Keeping it un-
der a separate section has been perceived as a signif-
icant achievement. Further deconcentration, with new 
responsibilities delegated to the Delegations, will have 
a positive effect on the implementation of programmes 
– though the heads of the development cooperation 
sections may need to fight for relevance and resourc-
es. On the other hand, some have warned against a 
potential sidelining of development, with funding being 
instrumentalised to pursue foreign policy objectives. 
Another fear concerns the weight of the development 
Commissioner vis-à-vis the High Representative. In 
the new Barroso Commission, interestingly, the post 
of development Commissioner – now separated from 
humanitarian aid – has been assigned to the Latvian 
Andris Piebalgs, who comes from a Member State 
with relatively little experience on development coop-
eration. Finally, some have raised concerns about the 
impact of the extended competence that the European 
Commission has acquired on trade policy, particularly 
in light of its bullying practises in the negotiations of 
the EPAs.2   
Conclusion
 The changes of the 2000s have had an impact 
on the nature of EU development policy, the role of 
the EU in the international arena, and the international 
development agenda. First, significant emphasis has 
been placed on efficiency and coherence in external 
relations over participation and ownership, thus alter-
ing the nature of the relations between the EU and the 
developing world. Moreover, the conclusion and imple-
mentation of the Cotonou Agreement show that policy 
space for developing countries has been considerably 
reduced. Second, the will to project a ‘European vision 
of development’ through the European Consensus on 
Development and the new agenda on aid effective-
ness is not only an attempt to make aid work better 
but is consistent with the EU’s overall agenda in ex-
ternal relations, that is to establish itself as a global 
power. Third, changes made in the EU have remark-
able implications for international development more 
broadly. In fact, not only is the EU the largest aid donor 
in the world, but also a number of policies that have 
a direct impact on developing countries (e.g. trade, 
agriculture, fisheries) are negotiated and decided in 
Brussels. With the policy coherence for development 
agenda, the EU has so far achieved less than it had 
expected, and not only because of the boycott of the 
non-development communities at the national level. 
 It should be by now clear the real added value 
of EU development policy – a number of scholars and 
practitioners had questioned this – is not linked to its 
‘global presence’, but to its role in the promotion of 
policy coherence for development and aid coordina-
tion among the Member States and the European 
Commission. In this sense, since the early 2000s, 
Member States have manifested a change of attitude 
and seem now better prepared to act in a more co-
ordinated fashion. More generally, the past decade 
has shown that development policy offers a significant 
example of the role that EU aspires to play in the in-
ternational arena. The Lisbon Treaty represents an im-
portant step forward for development cooperation by 
making poverty eradication the central aim of develop-
ment policy and strengthening the principles of policy 
coherence and requiring that Member States’ and EC 
development policies complement and reinforce each 
other. However, the space for an autonomous devel-
opment policy in the new institutional settings may be 
at risk, with a further potential politicisation of develop-
ment cooperation and instrumentalisation of develop-
ment funds for foreign policy objectives.
Maurizio Carbone, University of Glasgow, Scotland
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Ireland votes ‘No’, then ‘Yes’, once more: 
The Lisbon Treaty Referenda 
Maurits van der Veen
 On October 2, 2009, Irish voters approved the 
Lisbon Treaty in their country’s second referendum on 
the Lisbon Treaty. Turnout was 59.00%, with 67.13% 
in favor, compared to 32.87% against. In approving 
the Treaty, Irish voters gained the unique distinction of 
having twice first rejected and subsequently approved 
the same European integration treaty in successive 
referenda. They did so first with the Nice Treaty in 2001 
and 2002, and now with the Lisbon Treaty in 2008 and 
2009. This raises two important questions: could this 
second referendum crisis have been prevented, and 
was the final outcome ever in doubt? Or, to put it differ-
ently: How much did the two referendum campaigns 
matter? In this article, I will suggest that the answer is: 
not too much, and certainly less than most accounts 
imply.
 In her recent book about EU referenda, Europe 
in Question, Sara Hobolt develops a spatial voting 
model which highlights the significance not only of the 
text to be voted on, but also of the reversion point as-
sociated with a failed referendum. Voters may choose 
differently on the same treaty if their beliefs about 
the implications of rejecting that treaty change, even 
when the treaty text itself remains unchanged (2009). 
Hobolt’s study of the Irish referenda on the Nice Treaty 
suggests that a poorly run ‘Yes’ campaign combined 
with an active ‘No’ campaign generated considerable 
uncertainty among voters which, she argues, reduced 
the perceived utility of the Treaty. At the same time, 
voters believed that a ‘No’ vote would have few con-
sequences. As a result, the rejection of the Treaty in 
2001 — and the low referendum turnout — is not sur-
prising. In 2002, a more active ‘Yes’ campaign — and 
one which placed far greater emphasis on the conse-
quences of a ‘No’ — prior to the second referendum 
appears to have been the main cause of a changed 
outcome (2009, pp. 188-195).
 Analysts have told similar stories regarding 
the Lisbon Treaty referenda. Much has been made in 
the media of the lackluster quality of the “Yes” cam-
paign leading up to the first referendum, especially 
when compared to a highly energetic “No” campaign, 
which saw the rise to prominence of Declan Ganley’s 
Libertas organization. (O’Brennan, 2009). Moreover, 
a general sense of disillusionment with Irish party 
politics undoubtedly made voters less likely to accept 
the cues offered by the political elite (more than 90% 
Notes
1For the sake of clarity, the term ‘EC aid’ or ‘European 
Community Aid’ refers only to the programme managed 
by the European Commission, thus excluding bilateral 
aid from individual Member States. The term ‘EU aid’ 
includes both EC aid and the bilateral aid managed 
and disbursed by the 27 Member States
2It should be also noted that any reference ACP, in 
place since the Treaty of Maastricht, has been re-
moved from the Treaty of Lisbon. The ‘Declaration on 
the European Development Fund’, stipulating that the 
EDF should be outside the EU budget, has also dis-
appeared. This however does not mean that Member 
States will now support the ‘budgetization’ of the EFD, 
as requested by the European Parliament and, more 
recently, the European Commission.
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of the members of Parliament supported the Treaty) 
and more likely to believe some of the misinformation 
spread by various ‘No’ groups: that Ireland’s neutrality 
was at risk, education and healthcare would be priva-
tized, etc. (Chari, 2008). As had been the case with 
the Nice Treaty referenda, the run-up to the second 
referendum saw a more energized ‘Yes’ campaign, a 
less united ‘No’ campaign — without the involvement 
of Ganley until three weeks before the end — and a far 
greater emphasis on the negative consequences of a 
‘No’ for Ireland (de Bréadún, 2009). 
 Such an account suggest that campaign dy-
namics were decisive: the crisis could have been 
avoided through better campaigning the first time 
around, and the final result changed only because a 
better campaign was mounted the second time. Upon 
closer inspection, however, the campaigns appear 
less crucial. Instead, changing economic circumstanc-
es drove both outcomes. As Noel Whelan wrote in the 
Irish Times after the second referendum: 
No one should be fooled that this is reflective of an 
upsurge in Irish love for Europe or enthusiasm for 
the treaty. This swing was all about the changed 
economic context. If, out of hubris, the Irish elector-
ate felt they had the luxury of voting No to the treaty 
in June 2008, they have now out of economic des-
peration decided this time they had no option but to 
vote Yes.” (Whelan, 2009)
 In the next section, I argue that “the luxury of 
voting No” mischaracterizes the first referendum re-
sult. In fact, even the first referendum outcome was 
shaped by the looming economic crisis.
The 2008 Referendum: Clinging to the Present1 
 The turnout for both Lisbon referenda was well 
above the levels one would expect if the Lisbon crisis 
were largely a replay of the Nice crisis. Both Treaties 
were quite complex, and in both cases voters com-
plained about the lack of clear information regarding 
the contents of the Treaty. Hobolt’s model predicts that 
uncertainty about the contents of the Treaty is likely to 
increase the ‘No’ vote as well as reduce turnout. Data 
from the first Nice Treaty support these predictions 
(2009, pp. 188-195). Turnout for both Lisbon referen-
da however, was measurably higher than that for the 
two Nice referenda: 53.1% (Lisbon I) and 59.0% (Lis-
bon II) vs. 34.8% (Nice I) and 49.5% (Nice II). Unless 
uncertainty about the Treaty suddenly affected vote 
choice much more than turnout, which seems unlikely, 
this suggests that lack of information about the Treaty 
was less of a factor in the failed first referendum than 
some accounts have argued.
 In fact, opinions about the EU overall were less 
of a factor than one might expect. The Irish public is 
strongly supportive of European integration in gen-
eral. In the post-referendum Flash EB, 87% of all re-
spondents supported Ireland’s membership in the EU. 
Not surprisingly, the figure for ‘Yes’ voters was higher 
(98%) than that for ‘No’ voters (80%); nevertheless, it 
is clear that the vote choice of the latter was not driven 
by a strong euro-skepticism. Moreover, the survey in-
dicated that both camps largely agreed on the implica-
tions of Ireland’s ‘No’ vote for the EU and for Ireland’s 
membership therein: only 13% of ‘No’ voters and 10% 
of ‘Yes’ voters felt that the ‘No’ vote meant Ireland was 
on its way out of the EU, and both groups were about 
evenly divided on the statement that “the NO vote will 
block a more federal Europe”.
 However, the two camps did differ considerably 
in their perception of the reversion point. Three quar-
ters (76%) of ‘No’ voters believed that the outcome 
would “allow the Irish government to renegotiate ex-
ceptions for Ireland”, whereas only 38% of ‘Yes’ voters 
believed the same. In addition, 59% of ‘No’ voters be-
lieved that the present (i.e. pre-Lisbon) Treaty would 
be maintained after the failed referendum, whereas 
just 39% of ‘Yes’ voters thought this likely. ‘No’ voters 
were also much more likely to believe that Ireland’s 
position in the EU would be strengthened as a result 
of the referendum outcome (39% versus 18%) and, 
conversely, much less likely to believe that Ireland’s 
position would be weakened (24% versus 64%).
 This confidence among ‘No’ voters that rene-
gotiation was feasible, and would result in a better 
outcome for their country, is familiar from the failed 
French and Dutch referenda on the Constitutional 
Treaty three years earlier. At the time, 66% of Dutch 
citizens (71% of ‘No’ voters and 55% of ‘Yes’ voters) 
agreed that the failed referendum would allow for a 
renegotiation “in order to better defend the interests of 
the Netherlands,” and 59% of French citizens (80% of 
‘No’ voters and 27% of ‘Yes’ voters) believed the same 
regarding the interests of France.2  Those campaign-
ing against the Lisbon Treaty in Ireland almost univer-
sally argued that the Treaty was essentially identical to 
the Constitutional Treaty. Since negotiating the Lisbon 
Treaty had nevertheless been rather difficult, the be-
lief among Irish ‘No’ voters that another renegotiation 
was both feasible and likely to result in a meaningful 
improvement for Ireland suggests a willful ignorance 
on their part.
 In fact, as one observer noted after the first 
Lisbon Treaty referendum, “the result speaks… of a 
desperate desire for things to continue as they have 
been” (O’Toole, 2008). This desire appears to have 
been driven less by concerns about the implications 
of the Lisbon Treaty for the future development of the 
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EU — on which, as we have seen, ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ vot-
ers did not differ much — than by fears about the state 
of the Irish economy. Undoubtedly the ‘No’ campaign, 
in playing up some of these fears, had an impact. But 
uncertainty about the future, amidst a gathering global 
economic storm, may well have sufficed to doom the 
first referendum from the start. Turnout figures support 
this supposition: if voters were simply uncertain about 
the implications of the Treaty, turnout would likely have 
been low, as noted earlier. The high turnout, combined 
with the high proportion of ‘No’ voters who claim to 
believe in a successful renegotiation, indicates a de-
sire for things not to change, in a global context where 
change for the worse loomed on the horizon. Irish ‘No’ 
voters were clinging to the present, perhaps even des-
perately so.
The 2009 Referendum: Looking for a Safe Haven
 By the time the second referendum campaign 
began, one year after the first referendum, the global 
economic crisis had hit in earnest, with Ireland one of 
the most affected countries. The change was already 
brewing at the time of the first referendum; the Irish 
stock index (ISEQ), for example, began to trend down 
in May 2008. By July, a month after the referendum, 
the government projected a massive budget shortfall, 
and in August, unemployment rose to the highest level 
in a decade (“An Emergency Budget — It’s Time for 
Leadership, Not Politics,” 2008). By January, it had 
risen further to the highest monthly level since record-
keeping began in 1967. At the same time, the Euro-
pean Union looked even more important than it previ-
ously had. Irish voters had only to examine Iceland’s 
experiences in the Fall of 2008 to realize that things 
might well have been worse outside the embrace of 
the EU (and the euro). This was all the information they 
needed, and rendered the campaign almost moot.
 Indeed, turnout jumped far less between the 
first and second referendum than it had between the 
two Nice Treaty referenda (from 53.1 to 59.0, and from 
34.8 to 49.5, respectively). This already indicates that 
the second campaign did not make as much of a dif-
ference as it had in the case of the Nice Treaty. More-
over, whereas the media coverage of the Nice II cam-
paign had been far more extensive than that for Nice I, 
the coverage for Lisbon II was less salient than that for 
the first Lisbon referendum.3  Also telling is the point in 
time at which most citizens decided their vote. About 
70% of those surveyed after October 2nd had made 
up their minds by the start of the second campaign. A 
year earlier, in contrast, the same proportion of survey 
respondents had not decided on their final vote until 
the last few weeks of the referendum campaign.
 Survey respondents — especially those who 
voted ‘No’ — did complain about insufficient informa-
tion after both referenda. Here too, however, the pat-
tern is suggestive. Three possible answers captured 
different aspects of the problem: respondents could 
state that they felt insufficiently informed/aware of 1) 
the issues at stake, 2) the content of the treaty, and/or 
3) the issues raised by the referendum. As one might 
expect, an additional year of media coverage, plus 
a full second campaign, reduced the frequency with 
which respondents offered each of these answers. 
However, the decline for the first and third answers 
was considerably greater (down 12.8 and 13.4 per-
centage points respectively) than that for the second 
(down just 5 percentage points). The issues at stake 
had become much clearer, even if the Treaty itself re-
mained opaque.  In other words, changed perceptions 
of the reversion point were key, not increased informa-
tion about the Treaty. 
 Finally, we can turn to the reasons voters gave 
for their choices. Compared to the first referendum, 
fewer ‘Yes’ voters saw the Treaty as serving the best 
interest of Ireland (56.9% in 2008, 44% in 2009), and 
the proportion that considered it important to keep Ire-
land fully engaged in Europe remained more or less 
the same (16.3% in 2008, 15.4% in 2009). If a better 
campaign had produced more clarity about the Treaty 
and thus produced a ‘Yes’ vote, as many accounts 
argue, we would expect those figures to look rather 
different. On the other hand, the proportion of respon-
dents who believed a ‘Yes’ vote would help the Irish 
economy more than doubled from 14,9% to 38.1%. 
Once more, the changed fortunes of the Irish econo-
my appear to have been decisive.
 A similar pattern emerges among those who 
changed their vote from a ‘No’ in the first referendum 
to a ‘Yes’ in the second. Few of these voters expressed 
changed opinions on whether the Treaty was good or 
bad for Ireland, whether the EU had been good for 
Ireland, or whether the Treaty was good for the EU. 
However, fully a quarter of them indicated that help-
ing the Irish economy in this recession was a factor.4 
As the official survey report concludes: “protecting Ire-
land’s national economic interest was the main reason 
why citizens changed their votes in favor of the Treaty” 
(Gallup Organization, 2009, p. 20). 
 None of this is intended to suggest that the 
referendum campaigns were irrelevant. As noted, 
fewer respondents complained about a lack of infor-
mation after the second referendum. Moreover, vot-
ers had strong opinions about which campaign they 
found more convincing: in 2008, 67% of voters felt the 
‘No’ campaign was more convincing, compared to just 
15% for the ‘Yes’ campaign. In 2009 the figures were 
almost exactly reversed: 18& and 67%, respectively. 
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(Of course, this need not imply that either campaign 
changed anybody’s mind.) My central point is that the 
referendum campaigns appear to have had less of an 
impact than most accounts suggest. This raises some 
intriguing issues for the study of EU referenda more 
generally. The raw data of the October 2009 post-
referendum Flash EB remain under embargo, but it 
will be worth analyzing the responses in more detail 
once they become available. The logical starting point 
is the model presented in Hobolt’s excellent Europe 
in Question; as I have tried to suggest here, however, 
some additions or modifications may be necessary. 
Maurits van der Veen, University of Georgia
Notes
1Unless otherwise noted, survey results in the remain-
der of this article are drawn from the two post-refer-
endum Flash Eurobarometer surveys: nr. 245 in June 
2008 (Gallup Organization, 2008) and nr. 284 in Octo-
ber 2009 (Gallup Organization, 2009).
2Data from Flash EB 172 and 171, respectively.
3To give one very simple statistic: the search term 
“Lisbon Treaty” produces 813 hits in the archive of Irish 
Times for the three months prior to the first referendum, 
whereas it produces 693 hits (15% fewer) for the three 
months prior to the second referendum. The pattern 
for “Nice Treaty” in 2001 and 2002 is the opposite: the 
three months prior to the second referendum saw nearly 
75% more hits (589 compared to 338).
4In fact, the official survey report claims the figure is as 
high as 46% (Gallup Organization, 2009, p. 20), and the 
analogous figure for those who changed from not voting 
to voting ‘Yes’ 40%. However, these data appear to be 
at odds with the tables later in the report (2009, pp. 65-
66).
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Teaching EU History
George J. Sheridan, Jr.
 Introducing students to the European Union is 
a challenging enterprise.  This I have learned in teach-
ing a course at the University of Oregon in the Euro-
pean Studies program, designed for a student body 
with little or no background in the European Union. 
The course, titled “European Union History,” takes an 
historical approach to the topic, reflecting my own tra-
jectory of expertise that began with the teaching of Eu-
ropean economic history and, since the early 1990s, 
has focused on contemporary Europe. The reflections 
in the present essay convey some of the main impres-
sions derived from this experience.  Admittedly, these 
observations will apply more closely to a pedagogy 
having generalist aims than fostering disciplinary ex-
pertise.
 The challenges of the enterprise are mainly 
two.  The first shares with the teaching of any new 
subject, regardless of discipline and topic, the neces-
sity to generate rather quickly a knowledge and un-
derstanding of basic frameworks, information, and 
concepts without which discussion of large issues, 
significant relationships, and broader interpretations is 
limited at best.   For the study of the European Union, 
this means a basic literacy of the terminology, the con-
ceptual handles, the historical landmarks, and the in-
stitutional frameworks of European integration.  The 
historical elements require, additionally, conveying an 
acquaintance with historical actors, events, and con-
texts entirely or largely unfamiliar to most students. 
Transmitting this kind of elementary factual knowledge 
is a challenge in all history teaching, and teachers of 
history must learn the art of doing so with an eye to 
both the essential (that is, the art of avoiding cumber-
some detail and overwrought explanation) and the nu-
anced (that is, judicious insertion of detail and refine-
ment of explanation to curve an account that might 
initially come across as linear).  
 There is a second type of challenge in teach-
ing European integration history that distinguishes this 
teaching from that of most other historical topics.  This 
is keeping the subject interesting, engaging students’ 
attention and interest while communicating a basic 
knowledge of the subject area.  The challenge is aug-
mented by the hard-to-deny fact that, apart from cer-
tain dramatic events in EC/EU history that lend them-
selves to arresting narrative, many of the important 
features of the EC/EU story are either inherently unin-
teresting to relate or require laborious and tedious pre-
liminary background.  Interest in such topics rises, it is 
true, as one becomes more EC/EU literate, and as the 
capacity for conceptualization and analysis become 
progressively possible.  At that point ideas and argu-
ments can “trump” the potentially deadening effect of 
institutional facts and policy details.  But this requires 
a rather high order of learning discipline and deferred 
satisfaction that are not readily encountered among 
young (and many not so young) learners today.  The 
challenge here concerns less the choice of content, 
for the latter is to a large extent given by the subject, 
than finding a way to involve the student in the genera-
tion of that content.  This calls for a participatory type 
of learning that ideally models, to whatever degree is 
practical, the experience of encountering issues within 
the EU itself.
Literacy and Knowledge: Constructing the 
EU Historically
 The task of building a foundation of knowledge 
of EU fundamentals breaks down into three main 
steps in EU literacy: landmark treaties, major policy 
initiatives, and EU institutions.   In a course having a 
primarily historical orientation, these objects are the 
main constituents of the developing story of European 
integration since the end of World War II.  To the extent 
possible, the essential contours and provisions of each 
object, and the complexity surrounding each one’s ori-
gins, architecture, and interpretation, are made part 
of that story, or are at least elaborated parallel to the 
telling of the historical account in which the object was 
a main consideration.  This means including a certain 
density of presentation and explanation of high priority 
topics, beyond that required by the basic historical nar-
rative, with the aim of providing a more concentrated 
policy focus later in the course.  Integrated with such 
exposition of specific topics are certain self-contained 
historical narratives that have interest apart from this 
latter goal. Such narratives introduce key actors and 
events, include discussion of relevant context for ex-
planation of particular actions and occurrences, and, 
in some instances, exhibit drama.
 The framework that I have employed for under-
taking this task is largely chronological.  The following 
topics are treated in order: origins of European inte-
gration (1945-1952), origins and creation of the Eu-
ropean Common Market from the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC) to the European Economic 
Community (EEC ) (1952-1958), the early Common 
Market and the de Gaulle era (1958-1969), the period 
of Eurosclerosis (early 1970s – mid 1980s), the Sin-
gle European Act (early Delors presidency to around 
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1988), origins and the creation of the European Union 
(1988-1993), and the evolution of the European Union 
since 1993.  Within this chronological framework each 
of the landmark treaties is presented as the particular 
outcome of an historical process of issues, actors, and 
events, and also with attention to the major provisions 
of each treaty.  The treaties are the familiar ones: 
the Treaty of Paris establishing the ECSC (1951), 
the Treaties of Rome creating the EEC and Euratom 
(1957), the Single European Act (1986), the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU) creating the European Union 
(1992), and the text that began in the Convention on 
the Future of Europe and ended as the Lisbon Treaty 
(2007).  The policy initiatives that lend themselves 
to most extended discussion in this overview are the 
customs union and the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP), the internal market, the single currency as the 
key robust provision of the Treaty on European Union, 
and enlargement as both part of a long-term process 
of building European community since the early 1970s 
and as a major transformative initiative following the 
Treaty on European Union.  (Another possibility, which 
I have not used but which seems promising to draw 
students in, would be any of the several transatlan-
tic trade dispute cases from the 1963 chicken war to 
GMOs, steel, and so on). Two initiatives associated 
with failures of integration are included in this account: 
the European Defense Community of the early 1950s, 
and the European Constitution defeated in two nation-
al referendums in 2005.  One landmark achievement 
affecting subsequent progress towards an internal 
market is given attention as a major initiative, even 
though this was not a policy action in the same sense 
as the others. This is the ruling of the European Court 
of Justice on the Cassis de Dijon case (1979), estab-
lishing the principle of mutual recognition.
 Introducing the institutional dimension of in-
tegration presents special opportunities as well as 
challenges in approaching integration as an historical 
process.  The main opportunity lies in introducing in-
stitutions as tentative—experimental and contested—
enterprises in each historical phase of the developing 
architecture of integration.  Historically rendered, these 
are presented as subject to question and to repeated 
revision in the course of the Community/Union’s mov-
ing towards ever more differentiated and “higher” lev-
els of integration. This approach to institutions avoids 
a tendency to regard these as in some sense relatively 
fixed and full blown instruments of policy making and 
policy implementation.  The historical approach thus 
readily communicates to students both the central-
ity and the malleability of the institutions of European 
integration.  The challenge resides in articulating the 
complexity and ambiguity of the institutional picture, 
which brings the teacher back to the difficulty of intro-
ducing any new historical topic, only here magnified; 
namely, how much institutional detail and explanation 
to provide at any given point in the historical account. 
The institutional dimension also offers the occasion, 
and in some instances the necessity, to engage larger 
theoretical issues with regard to European integra-
tion, such as federalism and supra-nationality.  In one 
sense the task is simplified by associating certain ma-
jor institutional creations and revisions with particular 
landmark treaties.  For example, both the treaty creat-
ing the ECSC (Paris) and the treaty creating the Euro-
pean Common Market (Rome) lend themselves readily 
to overall presentations of the institutional framework 
of European integration, including the respective pow-
ers and membership of each institution and salient 
principles associated with the institutional framework 
adopted for each Community, such as the suprana-
tional bias of the ECSC.  Another kind of opportunity 
is provided by discussion of certain landmark devel-
opments, such as the Cassis de Dijon decision as an 
occasion for elaborating on the role of the European 
Court of Justice as furthering integration through case 
law.  Initiatives such as Community “summitry” in the 
early 1970s and the first direct elections of a European 
Parliament in 1979 serve respectively to introduce an 
additional institution of long-term importance, the Eu-
ropean Council, and to elaborate on the challenge of 
fostering popular sovereignty in the Community and, 
eventually, in the Union.  Both of these latter occur-
rences fit into a narrative dominated by the theme of 
“Eurosclerosis,” as examples of efforts to transcend 
institutional immobilisme and as exceptions to an oth-
erwise prevalent Euro-pessimism.
 An historical approach offers certain occasions 
where an engaging and multi-layered account of is-
sues and events facilitates the introduction and analy-
sis of institutional and policy topics.  In these instances 
a kind of “high drama” associated with particular mo-
ments of transition or crisis sweetens the otherwise 
mundane task of cultivating EU literacy.  I have found 
three such occasions especially fruitful for such pur-
pose.  One is the account of the origins of European 
integration in the immediate postwar years, culminat-
ing in the Schuman Declaration and the creation of the 
ECSC.  The second concerns the “empty chair” crisis 
of the mid-1960s.  The third addresses the renewal 
of integration commencing around the mid-1980s with 
the resolution of the budget crisis and the agreement 
to form an internal market by means of a case-by-case 
approach focusing on elimination of non-tariff barriers. 
The drama of renewal accelerates with the negotia-
tion, the signing, and the turbulent ratification of the 
Maastricht Treaty in the early 1990s.  Each of these 
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provides material for a richly contextualized narrative 
with key roles for imposing personalities, along with 
the opportunity to introduce or elaborate on major in-
stitutions or policies of broad significance for Europe-
an Union affairs.
 The origins narrative provides especially fer-
tile ground for contextualizing and assimilating three 
different yet convergent strands of postwar European 
history:  an economic and business history of recon-
struction, a classic foreign policy history centered on 
the perennial “German question” sharpened by the 
French national interest, and an international history 
of Cold War origins and imperatives, in which Ameri-
can and German interests come together in the cre-
ation of a politically democratic and economically lib-
eral West German federal state.  The personalities 
involved in this drama are of the most engaging and 
even colorful kind:  the French spirits manufacturer 
and war purchasing agent Jean Monnet, the ascetic 
and devout Lorrainer Robert Schuman, and the con-
servative Rhinelander Konrad Adenauer. The climax 
of the drama is nothing less than the initial modeling of 
a unique approach to building European community; 
namely, to quote one of the actors (Monnet 1978, p. 
316), “the building of a new Europe through the con-
crete achievement of a supranational regime within a 
limited but controlling area of economic effort.”
 The story of the “empty chair” crisis brings to 
center stage two other strong personalities whose 
clash of temperament and European vision gener-
ates a drama of near Shakespearean dimensions. 
Commission President Walter Hallstein and French 
President Charles de Gaulle articulate the deep, un-
resolved, and subsequently re-emerging, contest be-
tween the aspiration towards a supranational Europe, 
led by the Commission, and the reality of a member-
state-dominated “Europe of the Fatherlands,” repre-
sented by the unanimously-governed Council of Min-
isters. While involving these fundamental issues of 
European governance, the clash brings to the fore key 
policy matters—the budget, CAP, the customs union—
and highlights the significance of one the Community’s 
best proven formulas for success—prior agreement 
on and adherence to timelines.  Vigorous personali-
ties—Margaret Thatcher, François Mitterrand, Helmut 
Kohl—also take center stage in the rapid march from 
European Community to European Union, circa 1984 
to 1993, but here in a drama, to pursue the analogy, 
of a “comedy” of “ever closer union” rather than the 
immobiliste “tragedy” of 1966. Each personality repre-
sents a critical phase or turning point in their respec-
tive national political histories, but positioned differ-
ently along the ideological spectrum.  With the deft 
urging of a fourth personality, the “European” Jacques 
Delors, and a pro-liberal international economic en-
vironment, these nonetheless find common cause in 
a bold new vision for a united Europe, despite their 
otherwise incompatible ideological vintages.  The fall 
of the Berlin Wall and the re-unification of Germany 
heighten the drama, which concludes with the most 
ambitious sovereignty-abdicating agreement to date, 
the decision to adopt a single European currency and 
to subscribe to common macroeconomic policies to 
make that currency work.  In these narratives there is 
no need to embellish or even to simplify policy details 
or issues of fundamental principle to maintain student 
interest.  The scenarios are sufficiently engaging and 
intellectually absorbing to make the acquisition of EU 
literacy a delightful task. 
Engaging the Individual Student:  
Learning by Doing
 The appeal of intrinsically interesting narra-
tive with arresting drama and flashy personality can 
only go so far as a way of “widening” and “deepen-
ing” students’ familiarity with EU issues and process-
es.  The challenge of engaging student interest can 
be addressed more systematically.  Ironically it is the 
abundance of EU documentary sources, the reading 
of most of which is a dreary prospect, which facilitates 
this undertaking.  The approach I adopted for the “Eu-
ropean Union History” course combines the historian’s 
fascination with “the sources” (meaning primary sourc-
es) with the policy-maker’s focus on concrete prob-
lems and practical solutions.  I do this in two ways. 
Beginning at about the mid-point of the course, I divide 
the remainder into three weekly modules.  These are 
devoted respectively to economic policy, social policy, 
and external relations.  Each module has two compo-
nents.  One consists of my presentation of core topics 
in each policy area—big-picture bullet points, in effect. 
These include major theories as well as specific poli-
cies addressing core issues in the policy area.  The ap-
proach is thematic and analytical rather than historical. 
The second component consists of student presenta-
tions of their individual research on particular policy 
topics in the relevant area, and interaction with other 
students in a small group forum to share the results 
of their research and to identify convergent themes. 
The research is undertaken as part of the independent 
project work for the course, and has certain mandat-
ed requirements in terms of use of original EC or EU 
sources.  Students generate their own topics and un-
dertake the research in a variety of source collections, 
such as the Bulletin of the European Union, the Gen-
eral Report on the Activities of the European Union, 
and specialized publications such as Eurobarometer. 
Priority is placed on research in these original sources, 
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with a very limited topical focus, rather than on investi-
gating and analyzing policy issues through secondary 
sources.  Each student thus becomes knowledgeable 
about that precise topic in her or his group, referencing 
the same materials as those generated and consulted 
by EU policy-makers themselves.  The result, I have 
found, is a level of student engagement far beyond 
that generated by “book learning” alone.  Especially 
impressive have been instances of creative search-
ing and locating unanticipated documentation, and the 
enthusiastic contribution to student discussion that en-
sues.
 Undertaking this kind of research requires a 
prior introduction to the sources themselves and, es-
pecially, to methods of using these for the kind of tasks 
students are asked to perform.  Ideally this would in-
volve a parallel workshop, or special sessions, taking 
place in the first half of the course centered on the 
actual processes by which EU documents are gener-
ated and published.  The outcome of such a workshop 
would be a familiarity with the structure of the main 
sources and communicating certain tips and tools for 
searching these sources. Especially important is an 
understanding of EU legislation and of the respective 
roles of the three institutions primarily involved in law-
making in the European Union: the European Commis-
sion, the European Parliament, and the Council of the 
European Union (the Council of Ministers).  Through 
what is essentially a hands-on process that will cul-
minate in an individual case study, students learn by 
doing the complex functioning of these three core in-
stitutions.
 The individual student’s research task is aided 
in the course by a specially-designed course website 
that serves simultaneously as an elaborate syllabus, 
as an introduction to and overview of sources, and es-
pecially as a user-friendly window with links to online 
documentation, reference, and external websites that 
students can use in their independent research.  In ad-
dition to ready access to EU documents in the Bulletin 
and General Report, for example, the website home 
page provides “Quick Links” to the EUROPA website, 
to the official website of the European Commission, to 
the A to Z Index of European Union Websites provided 
through the website of the European Commission Del-
egation to the United States, and to the University of 
Pittsburgh library’s EU reference and subject guides. 
Part of the class time in the initial weeks of the course 
is devoted to a “tour” of these sites, especially the very 
elaborate EUROPA website.
 Instruction in EU documents and their corre-
sponding legislative antecedents, and the building of 
a website custom-designed for the purposes of this 
course, benefited from a unique collaboration between 
me and two units of the university library.  These were 
the Government Documents department, the head of 
which had expertise in European Union materials, and 
the university’s Center for Educational Technologies, 
which built the website.  Through Government Doc-
uments, students had access to a wealth of source 
materials, both historical and contemporary, and with 
the guidance of its head, special instruction in access-
ing these materials.  He walked students through the 
law-making process in the EU, so that, in searching 
for documents on specific topics, students understood 
how these had been generated and thus were able 
to locate and make use of relevant subject indexes 
and search engines.  The construction of the website 
involved extensive dialogue between me, librarians, 
site designers and technicians, in which the priori-
ties of content were balanced with both aesthetic and 
“user- friendly” considerations.  In the years follow-
ing the initial construction, our Center for Educational 
Technologies built additional features into the website. 
These included “factoids” of interest in the history of 
European integration, as well as a variety of interac-
tive features for instructional, reference, and research 
purposes.  Among the latter were maps; comparative 
graphs of indices such as exports, government expen-
ditures, immigration, per capita GDP and the like; EU 
institutions; and regions and regional policy.  The most 
ambitious interactive feature built into the website is 
an EU timeline.  The timeline enables students to ac-
cess, for each year since 1945, prominent EU events 
(such as the Schuman Plan or the Empty Chair crisis), 
world events, and EU personalities, and for each such 
item, a brief overview, visual images or video clips, 
links to online sites for accessing additional informa-
tion or documents, a brief subject bibliography, and 
cross references to related timeline items.
Course Textbooks and Other Teaching Resources
 In addition to the content accessed through the 
website, the course uses as its main text Desmond Di-
nan (2005).  This has the advantage of extensive treat-
ment of each EU institution and of each major policy 
area, in addition to providing a comprehensive histori-
cal overview.  The text is ideally suited to the course’s 
joint historical/narrative and thematic approach, and to 
the priority given to the aim of developing institutional 
and policy “literacy” among students.  In addition, a 
rich collection of documents pertaining to the forma-
tive years of European integration (Wells 2007), that 
includes a concise narrative of events of this period, is 
being used in this year’s course.  The course has also 
made use of various free publications of the Office for 
Official Publications of the European Communities, on 
topics such as environmental policy, language issues, 
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public opinion surveys, and regional policy.  Especially 
valuable has been Klaus-Dieter Borchardt (2000) on 
Community law institutions and procedures, currently 
available online through EUROPA.
 The course has served, finally, as a forum 
for guest lectures and videoconferences with distin-
guished EU officials, facilitated through our university’s 
affiliation with the European Union Center at the Uni-
versity of Washington.  On one occasion, the course 
was enriched by a two-week visiting professorship of a 
distinguished European scholar of integration, Staffan 
Zetterholm, Jean Monnet Professor in European Po-
litical Integration at Aalborg University.  Each year “Eu-
ropean Union History” has thus welcomed a variety of 
enrichment opportunities providing personal contacts 
and horizons of expertise on contemporary European 
Union affairs that contribute handsomely to the stu-
dent learning experience.
George J. Sheridan, Jr., 
University of Oregon, Eugene
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fall in the sensitive realm of Justice and Home Affairs, 
and the development of a Common Foreign and Secu-
rity Policy.  Menon weaves a basic concept throughout 
the work: the EU is, and is likely to remain, a collection 
of nation states that recognize the value of integration, 
but whose leaders will consistently push their national 
agenda as well as personal political interests at every 
opportunity.  
 The core strength of the book is that it provides 
a lucid overview of what the EU is and what it does, but 
more importantly why it exists in its current form and 
where it might be going.  This is a significant achieve-
ment in and of itself that should be of particular value 
to citizens of EU member states.  Menon manages to 
strip away the jargon and simplify the structures of the 
EU in a manner that makes the subject- and its impor-
tance- easily accessible to non-specialists.  
 One negative point is the surprising lack of 
reference to the transatlantic relationship.   Not only 
do the United States and the EU maintain the single 
largest trading relationship in the world, they are also 
bound together on security issues because most mem-
ber states are also members of NATO.  That security 
relationship was also an important factor in resolving 
the security dilemma that allowed the space for the an-
tecedents to the EU to develop.  A bit more discussion 
of this relationship, particularly in the section on the 
evolving role for the EU in foreign and security policy, 
would have made for a more complete discussion.
 This, however, is a relatively minor complaint. 
Europe: The State of the Union fills a needed gap in 
the popular literature on the EU and gives non-spe-
cialists a clear-eyed explanation of the EU without be-
ing slavishly pro-EU or Euro-skeptic.  
Zachary Selden
Chang Michele. Monetary Integration in the European 
Union. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. 
 Monetary Integration in the European Union 
provides a comprehensive overview of the creation 
and evolution of the Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU), its institutions and policies of economic coor-
dination, as well as the EMU’s significance for political 
integration in the European Union (EU). This volume 
is logically divided into four sections, based on the 
questions that are primarily addressed by the chapters 
in each section. Chapters two and three provide an 
overview of the history of monetary integration, focus-
ing on the political and economic reasons behind the 
particular nature of the EMU. The next three chapters 
present the institutions that shape decision-making 
Book Reviews
Menon, Anand. Europe: The State of the Union. Lon-
don: Atlantic, 2008
 Anand Menon’s latest book is not, nor is it in-
tended to be, an academic text breaking new theoreti-
cal ground.  Instead, Europe: The State of the Union is 
a highly readable, accessible- and at times even witty- 
look at the development of the European Union with a 
distinct point of view.
 In Menon’s assessment, the EU plays an im-
portant role for the national leaders of the member 
states who can shift responsibility to the EU for neces-
sary but potentially unpopular decisions.  At the same 
time, those same national leaders can score political 
points in the domestic arena by attacking in public the 
policies that they privately push for at the EU level. 
This tension between doing what is necessary for the 
member states of the EU to prosper in the current in-
ternational environment and doing what is necessary 
to win re-election is a consistent driver of events, or 
what Menon terms, “the paradox of integration”.  The 
EU is thus both a necessary and effective tool of the 
member states, but one that they are reluctant to let 
stray off the leash held by the national governments.
 Europe: The State of the Union is divided into 
sections whose headings (“Europe for the Exasperat-
ed”, “Fragile Union”) give some indication of Menon’s 
realistic, some might say jaded, view of what the EU 
is and does.  Beginning with a summary of the his-
tory of the EU, Menon tells the story of how it evolved 
from something as ostensibly limited as the European 
Coal and Steel Community, making it clear that the 
seeds for the EU were contained within the ECSC.  He 
then moves on to a more detailed explanation of how 
the common market works in theory and practice, the 
progress of the EU in taking on new challenges that 
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in the monetary union, especially the European Cen-
tral Bank, and the policies of economic coordination, 
through the Stability and Growth Pact and the Lisbon 
Strategy. Chapters seven and eight look at the EMU 
from outside of the Eurozone, considering the impact 
of opt-outs and the slow adoption of the single curren-
cy by the new member states, as well as discussing 
the international importance of the Euro in comparison 
with the dollar as a major reserve currency around the 
world. The last chapter provides a balance sheet of 
the Euro-zone, and the conclusion presents Chang’s 
argument for a closer cooperation and coordination 
among member states and supranational actors re-
garding economic policies. 
 Each chapter in Monetary Integration is struc-
tured similarly, starting with a description of historical 
processes, theories, institutions, or policies, and then 
moving to discuss the role of ideas, interests and in-
stitutions in shaping the outcomes presented at the 
beginning of the chapter. In theoretical section of each 
chapter, Chang focuses on summarizing scholarly 
works by economists and political scientists, adding 
her own analysis where appropriate.  Among the ideas, 
interests and institutions that are discussed in multiple 
contexts are the theory of optimum currency areas, 
the ‘sound money’ paradigm, German leadership as 
well as desire of other member states to balance the 
dominant role of German-type policies, the conflicting 
interests of large and small member states, as well as 
political business cycles.
 The main conclusions of Monetary Integration 
are as follows. (1) Political factors clearly shaped the 
development and the nature of monetary integration 
despite the existence of strong technocratic reasons 
for the establishment of the EMU. (2) Neither of the 
three objectives of monetary integration, increased 
political cooperation, economic growth and greater in-
ternational influence, are fully achieved and the EMU 
is at least partly responsible for its lack of success. (3) 
Important economic decisions continue to be made at 
the member state level without coordination with EU 
institutions or other member states, and at the same 
time (4) member states continue to diverge regarding 
their preferred policy objectives. 
 Chang concludes that the creation of the mon-
etary union is on balance a success but argues that 
faced with significant challenges in the future, the 
EMU needs to overcome its legitimacy problems es-
pecially if it hopes for a stronger international role. 
Chang shows that the process of monetary integration 
in the European Union also suffers from the demo-
cratic deficit attributed to the rest of the EU. Specifi-
cally, the legitimacy of the EMU depends on its abil-
ity to achieve economic growth, although there is no 
agreement among the member states regarding which 
policies and institutions are best in producing this 
economic outcome. At the same time, the decision-
making structure of the EMU does not clearly attribute 
accountability between actors, which has led to incon-
sistent policies with less than favorable economic out-
comes. Overcoming these challenges requires strong 
leadership and the cooperation of the domestic and 
supranational actors involved in monetary integration. 
While Chang presents a very strong argument for the 
need to reform the decision-making and accountability 
mechanisms in the EMU, she is less forceful in de-
lineating the institutional configurations that are nec-
essary for the successful completion of the monetary 
integration project. But perhaps discussing such a so-
lution warrants a separate book. 
 I found Monetary Integration to be very read-
able and engaging with Chang’s elaborate descrip-
tion of events, institutions and policies and a masterful 
discussion of conflicting arguments and viewpoints. 
The structure of each chapter, historical overview or 
description, followed by analysis through the perspec-
tives of ideological, interest-based, and institutional 
explanations, facilitates a comparison between argu-
ments and policies. While summaries of existing argu-
ments could at times be overwhelming for a reader 
unfamiliar with theories of economic integration, the 
index at the end of the book is very helpful in clarifying 
the sometimes-overwhelming array of acronyms that 
accompanies the study of the EU in general. 
 Having taught EU monetary integration for a 
number of years, using ever-changing amalgamations 
of book chapters and journal articles, I was especially 
pleased to ‘discover’ Chang’s book. It contains, in a 
manageable volume, all the necessary components of 
a comprehensive overview of EU economic integra-
tion: history and ideological underpinnings, institu-
tions, and policies and their consequences. I did not 
hesitate to assign Monetary Integration to my class 
this semester. 
Petia Kostadinova
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Congratulations to 2009 EUSA Award Winners
EUSA Award for Lifetime Achievement in European Studies
    Philippe C. Schmitter
EUSA Public Service Award in European Studies
    Ruth Mitchell-Pitts, Executive Director of the European Union Center of 
Excellence, 
                University of North Carolina
EUSA Award for the best book published in 2007 or 2008
     Fabio Franchino. 2007. The Powers of the Union: Delegation in the EU. 
Cambridge: Cambridge 
                 University Press.
 Honorable mention:
      Simon Hix, Abdul Noury and Gerard Roland. 2007. Democratic Politics 
in the European 
                  Parliament. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
EUSA Award for the Best Dissertation defended in 2007 or 2008
                  Alexandra Hennessy. Economic Interests, Domestic Constraints, and 
the Creation of a European         Single Pension Market. Ph.D. 
Dissertation Boston University.
 Honorable mention:
      Umut Aydin. From Competition to Cooperation: Subsidies in the United 
States, Canada and  
      the European Union. Ph.D. Dissertation University of Washington.
EUSA Award for the Best Paper presented at the 2007 EUSA conference
      Tom Delreux (University of Leuven). "The EU as a Negotiator in Multi-
lateral Chemicals                Negotiations: Multiple Principals, 
Different Agents."
 Honorable mention: 
       Alexandra Hennessy (Clarkson University). "Cheap Talk or Credible 
Signals? Economic Interests and         the Construction of a Single 
Pension Market in Europe."
